We provide a duality-based framework for revenue maximization in a multiple-good monopoly. Our framework shows that every optimal mechanism has a certificate of optimality, taking the form of an optimal transportation map between measures. Using our framework, we prove that grand-bundling mechanisms are optimal if and only if two stochastic dominance conditions hold between specific measures induced by the buyer's type distribution. This result strengthens several results in the literature, where only sufficient conditions for grand-bundling optimality have been provided. As a corollary of our tight characterization of grand-bundling optimality, we show that the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items each supported on [c, c + 1] is a grand-bundling mechanism, as long as c is sufficiently large, extending Pavlov's result for 2 items [Pavlov 2011] . Surprisingly, our characterization also implies that, for all c and for all sufficiently large n, the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items supported on [c, c + 1] is not a grand bundling mechanism. The necessary and sufficient condition for grand bundling optimality is a special case of our more general characterization result that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality of an arbitrary mechanism for an arbitrary type distribution.
INTRODUCTION
We study the problem of revenue maximization for a multiple-good monopolist. Given n heterogenous goods and a probability distribution f over R n ≥0 , we wish to design a mechanism that optimizes the monopolist's revenue against an additive (linear) buyer whose values for the goods are distributed according to f . The single-good case is wellunderstood [Myerson 1981 ], but the multi-good case has been dauntingly difficult. [Rochet and Stole 2003; Manelli and Vincent 2007] provide comprehensive surveys.
While prior work has provided solutions to special cases of the problem, we develop a general framework, based on duality theory, that applies to arbitrary settings of n and f . We identify a minimization problem that is dual to revenue maximization and prove that the optimal values of these problems are always equal. Our framework allows us to identify optimal mechanisms in general settings, and certify their optimality by providing a complementary solution to the dual problem (namely finding a solution to the dual whose objective value equals the mechanism's revenue). In more detail: Strong Duality Framework: It is known that revenue maximization can be written as maximizing the expectation of the buyer's utility u with respect to a signed measure µ, defined in terms of n and f . The constraints of this program are that u be monotone, L 1 -Lipschitz, and convex. In the absence of the convexity constraint, the problem can be dualized as an optimal transport problem using Monge-Kantorovich duality theory [Daskalakis et al. 2013 ]. As convexity is crucial for truthfulness, one of our main A full version of this paper can be found at http://arxiv.org/pdf/1409.4150.pdf This work was supported by a Sloan Foundation Fellowship, a Microsoft Research Faculty Fellowship, NSF Awards CCF-0953960 (CAREER) and CCF-1101491, a Simons Graduate Award, and a Hertz Foundation Daniel Stroock Fellowship. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. contributions is to develop a new variant of Monge-Kantorovich duality that accommodates this constraint. As a result, we show that revenue maximization has a strong dual problem, taking the form of an optimal transport problem. Roughly speaking, our dual formulation is given the signed measure µ and solves the following minimization problem: (i) first, it is allowed to massage µ into a measure µ that dominates µ with respect to a particular "convex dominance" stochastic order; (ii) second, it is supposed to find a coupling of the positive part µ + of µ with its negative part µ − ; (iii) if a unit of mass of µ + at x is coupled with a unit of mass of µ − at y, we are charged ||x − y|| 1 . The goal is to minimize the expected cost of the coupling with respect to the decisions in (i) and (ii). Our duality theorem is reminiscent of the min-cost matching/potential maximization duality in combinatorial optimization, albeit arguing strong duality is more involved and surprising in the continuous world with convexity constraints. In turn, strong duality is important for our application, as it implies that, for all settings of n and f , the optimal mechanism always admits a certificate of optimality, in the form of a transport map. Characterization of Mechanism Optimality: Substantial effort in the literature has been devoted to studying optimality of mechanisms with a simple structure such as pricing mechanisms; see, e.g., [Manelli and Vincent 2006] and [Daskalakis et al. 2013] for sufficient conditions under which the mechanism that only prices the grand bundle of all items is optimal. Our second main result obtains necessary and sufficient conditions characterizing the optimality of arbitrary mechanisms. Given a mechanism M with a finite menu, we can partition the buyer's typeset into finitely many regions R 1 , . . . , R k of types who buy each menu option. The question is this: for what type distributions is M optimal? We answer this question with a sharp characterization result: M is optimal if and only if the signed measure µ (derived from the type distribution as described above) satisfies k stochastic dominance conditions, one per region in the afore-defined partition. The type of stochastic dominance that µ restricted to region R i ought to satisfy depends on the allocation to types from R i , namely which set of items are allocated with probability 1, 0, or non-0/1. As a corollary of this result we provide a characterization of grand-bundling optimality. We also use it to extend Pavlov's result for n = 2, showing that, for any number n, there exists a large enough c such that the optimal mechanism for n i.i.d. uniform [c, c + 1] items is a grand-bundling mechanism. While maybe an intuitive claim (perhaps due to concentration of measure), we do not see a direct way of proving this claim. Perhaps defying intuition, we show that in the same setting of n i.i.d. uniform [c, c + 1] items, for all c and all large enough n the optimal mechanism is not (!) a grand-bundling mechanism. More details can be found in the full version of the paper [Daskalakis et al. 2015] .
